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Abstract
Efficient and reliable automated detection of modified image and multimedia files has long been a challenge
for law enforcement, compounded by the harm caused by repeated exposure to psychologically harmful
materials. In August 2019 Facebook open-sourced their PDQ and TMK + PDQF algorithms for image
and video similarity measurement, respectively. In this report, we review the algorithms’ performance
on detecting commonly encountered transformations on real-world case data, sourced from contemporary
investigations. We also provide a reference implementation to demonstrate the potential application and
integration of such algorithms within existing law enforcement systems.
1. Introduction
In April 2019 the Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (Cth)
criminalised the failure to report and/or remove Australian-related Abhorrent Violent Material (AVM)1
by ISPs, hosting and content providers[1]. Events such as the Christchurch terror attack of March 2019
demonstrated the potential not only for publication of such acts, but also their re-distribution en masse
after minor modification in order to avoid traditional (cryptographic hash-based) detection and blocking
methods by online content providers. The mandatory reporting of such materials by multiple providers
worldwide would rapidly overwhelm law enforcement’s ability to review and investigate, unless a reliable,
portable and acceptable means for measuring similarity is adopted.
In August 2019 Facebook open-sourced the algorithms and released reference implementations of PDQ
and TMK + PDQF, their internally used image and video similarity measurement algorithms[2]. At time
of writing, these are freely available at the ThreatExchange github repository2.
In this report, we run the algorithms through a battery of tests based on typically encountered modi-
fication scenarios, using real-world data taken from actual Australian Federal Police (AFP) investigations.
Moving beyond mere performance, we also provide a reference implementation of our own, demonstrat-
ing the portability and accessibility of such algorithms when effectively packaged and presented through
standards-based APIs.
Email addresses: janis.dalins@afp.gov.au;janis.dalins@monash.edu (Janis Dalins), campbell.wilson@monash.edu
(Campbell Wilson), douglas.boudry@afp.gov.au (Douglas Boudry)
1“the most egregious, violent audio, visual material perpetrated by the perpetrator or accomplice”
2https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/tree/master/hashing
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2. Background
Cryptographic hashes such as MD5 and SHA-1 have long formed the basis for identifying identical data
at the binary level. This makes them exceedingly powerful at detecting identical materials - for example,
copies of a known file, but by design, completely useless for detecting similar materials. Investigations
involving large quantities of shared electronic materials (such as AVM and child exploitation materials
(CEM)) typically involve light (if not entirely imperceptible) changes to these materials as they are shared.
Images and videos, for example, often have watermarks/text added and formats changed (e.g. jpg → png),
either intentionally by the offenders or as a by-product of the services used to effect sharing and transfer.
The efficacy of cryptographic hashes in detecting perceptibly identical materials is therefore limited.
Such limitations would be regarded as inconveniences and inefficiencies in most workplaces, but the true
cost of exposure to such materials is only now becoming apparent - not only to front line investigators,
but also supporting personnel such as digital forensic examiners and intelligence analysts. Each failure
to automatically recognise perceptibly identical materials results in another instance of exposure. Given
the sheer volume of materials currently being encountered and seized by Australian police, these repeat
exposures could conservatively be estimated in the hundreds of thousands per annum within Australia law
enforcement alone.
Unlike binary-level digest algorithms such as MD5 and SHA-1, perceptual hashes are a mode of fuzzy
hashing operating on materials as rendered to the end user, making them highly suitable for detecting lightly
or imperceptibly altered materials.
Microsoft has for some years made available PhotoDNA, an image similarity algorithm, on a no-cost
basis to law enforcement and other practitioners - primarily for use in detecting CEM. Whilst zero cost,
users are required to sign a licensing agreement prior to receiving access to the code, with usage largely
limited to organisations dealing directly with CEM. PhotoDNA has been unquestionably effective within
child protection, and Microsoft is to be commended for it’s early, proactive support in the field. However,
the limited rollout and support of this algorithm across law enforcement beyond child protection limits its
useability.
The release and open-sourcing of similarity based hashing algorithms is a welcome development, not only
as a means for detecting likely duplicate materials within an organisation, but also for the free sharing of
such intelligence at a technical level. Of course, this is on the assumption that they are sufficiently accurate,
robust and efficient for deployment and use.
2.1. The Algorithms
In this section we provide a very brief overview of the PDQ and TMK + PDQF algorithms. Readers
seeking a more in-depth understanding should refer to hashing.pdf3 within the project repository.
2.1.1. PDQ
In the words of the authors, a Perceptual algorithm utilising a Discrete Cosine Transform and outputting
(amongst others) a Quality metric, is inspired by and an evolution of the (DCT flavour of) pHash [3], a
perceptual hashing algorithm familiar to many within digital forensics.
PDQ is stored as a 256 bit hash, representable as a 64 character hexadecimal string. We will not attempt
to describe the algorithm’s design here, but will oversimplify to state that the hash represents the output
of a 16x16 transform of the original image via subimage averaging followed by a quantized discrete cosine
transform, with each bit being 1 if greater than the overall median in the respective transform position,
and 0 otherwise. A quality score broadly proportional to the number of interesting features is introduced to
identify image frames that are typically too visually uniform to be useful.
3https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/blob/master/hashing/hashing.pdf
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Similarity between two hashes is measured via Hamming distance4, with a distance of 0 indicating
perceptually/syntactically identical content5. Statistically, a mean distance of 128 would be anticipated for
randomly selected hash pairs, with the authors reporting 30 or less being a good measure for confidently
matching materials.
2.2. TMK + PDQF
TMK + PDQF (‘TMK’ for brevity) uses a modified version of PDQ6 for image similarity, combined
with the Temporal Match Kernel for measuring time-related information. Its operation is summarised
thus within documentation: (1) resampling videos to a common frame rate (15 frames per second), (2)
calculating a frame descriptor, (3) computing averages within various periods and (4) generating a hash
from the trigonometrically weighted averages. Given the (in our opinion) greatly increased complexity from
PDQ, readers are perhaps best referred to the original paper at [4] for further information.
TMK stores hashes as 258KB binaries (extension .tmk), but the authors are quick to note that the
first kilobyte is sufficient to differentiate most videos. This 1KB value (known as the level 1 feature) is an
unweighted average of all frame features (i.e. PDQF), and forms the first phase of comparison. The level
2 feature is a collection of weighted averages, totalling 256KB. Metadata regarding the calculation is also
included within each file, bringing the total size to 258KB.
TMK utilises a two phase match comparison process:
1. Phase 1: Cosine similarity is calculated between the level 1 (i.e. 1KB) features of two hashes, with a
score between -1.0 and 1.0 (inclusive) generated. Higher scores indicate greater similarity. A match
threshold of 0.7 is recommended by the authors, and is used throughout our testing.
2. Phase 2: The level 2 (i.e. 256KB) features of two hashes are compared and a score in the range 0.0-1.0
generated. Higher scores indicate closer matches, with 0.7 being recommended as a match threshold.
This recommendation is adopted within our testing
3. The Test Environment
All tests and activities conducted within this report were carried out on a Dell Precision 5530 notebook
computer running Ubuntu Desktop 18.04, installed in August 2019 and patched (using apt get update)
on the day of commencing these experiments. The PDQ and TMK algorithms and associated software were
obtained via a git clone of the Facebook ThreatExchange repository [5]. We then installed ffmpeg, a
pre-requisite for TMK and performed make commands for the C++ versions 7 of both algorithms. The make
process includes sense-checks and tests at conclusion - the TMK process reported errors, but these were
caused by an incorrect path setting for the ffmpeg binary. We manually performed the tests and observed
nil reported errors.
Beyond this minor hiccup, the installation process was fast and uncomplicated, though we recommend
users have at least a basic understanding of software compilation and builds for this stage.
3.1. Test Corpus
All tests reported within this paper were conducted on a corpus of 225,887 images and 3,366 videos man-
ually reviewed by Police and annotated as child exploitation materials. These files were sourced exclusively
from 10 investigations undergoing finalisation by one Australian jurisdiction’s Joint Anti Child Exploitation
Team (JACET) in July 2019 - the relative skew between media types reflects the materials as located. These
matters may remain subject to further judicial proceedings, therefore no further details of their provenance
will be provided.
4aka ’edit distance’ - how many differences there are between two identically lengthed strings/vectors. For example, the
Hamming distance between abc and abd is 1. No attempt is made to measure the distance beween changed characters -
changing the second vector to abz still results in a Hamming distance of 1.
5Assuming ‘quality’ imagery
6The final conversion to binary of each 16x16 transform value is removed, leaving the original figure
7A python library has since been included within the repository
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Figure 1: Test corpus video runtimes
For tests benefitting from separate corpora, we utilised about 322,490 images of lawful pornography first
used by [6], plus a partial (approx. 596,000 images) download of the Google Open Images Dataset [7].
4. Testing Imagery (PDQ)
Once installed and built, the PDQ software is presented as a series of executables - we utilised pdq-photo-hasher
for our tests.
We developed a python script automating test corpus (refer Section 4.1) generation, copying each file
from a source drive, calling the pdq hashing binary for each variation, parseing the results (via regex) and
then calculating the respective hamming distances.
4.1. Methodology
Each image within our test corpus was subjected to the following transformations, as illustrated in Figure
2
1. Format change - the image is converted to a random selection of JPEG, TIFF, PNG, or bitmap formats.
2. Watermark - The AFP logo was added to the bottom right corner, being 14 the size of the image’s
shorter dimension. The logo is non-transparent, with numerous colour shifts and rendered surfaces.
3. Text - ‘AiLECS’ is added to the image in the top left-hand corner, with the font size being the largest
before the text itself extends beyond 12 the size of the shorter dimension.
4. Thumbnail - the image is reduced in size to 32, 64, 128 and 256 pixels for the longer dimension, akin to
file previews automatically generated in applications such as Windows Explorer and MacOS Finder.
Figure 2e displays a 32 pixel thumbnail.
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5. Cropping - a random proportion of the image greater than 0% and less than 100% is selected and
retained, using the existing image centre and aspect ratio. Figure 2c displays cropping areas for ratios
0.5-0.9 (i.e. retain half → retain 90%) inclusive, using increments of 0.1
6. Rotation - the image is randomly rotated between 1 and 359 degrees inclusive. Figure 2d displays a
45◦rotation.
In order to compare processing overheads, we timed the original hashing of each image using the PDQ
algorithm, and also MD5. In order to maintain consistency with the PDQ process, the MD5 was calculated
using an external binary (md5sum) rather than from a buffer within the python script. Furthermore, this
step was carried out at random either at the first encounter of each file, or later in the process in order to
compensate for any operating system or device-level caching.
4.2. Results
We observed the PDQ algorithm to perform strongly when minor/imperceptible changes are made or
features are added to the rendered image, whilst struggling with removal or alteration.
4.3. Format Change
As anticipated, the algorithm was robust to format changes, reflecting its use of the rendered image
(rather than underlying binary values) for hash calculation. 99.96% of format changed images met the
match threshold of 30, necessitating the use of log scale for the y axis in Figure 3. To summarise, over
94.85% of format changes resulted in no hash alteration (i.e. a hamming distance of 0), with a further
5.01% reporting a hamming distance of 2. No hamming distances of 1 were identified, in keeping with the
reasoning detailed in Section 2.1.1).
4.4. Watermark
PDQ was not as robust to the introduction of a watermark as it was to changes to underlying formats.
Figure 4 shows that just overhalf of all watermarked images would be missed if the hamming distance
threshold of 30 was strictly adhered to. Whilst disappointing, the test does involve a rather intrusive change
to the image, with a completely opaque watermark featuring numerous features and color shifts. This should
be regarded as an extreme example of such alteration.
4.5. Text
Being less intrusive than the aforementioned watermarking, PDQ performed more strongly in this test.
Figure 4 shows that a vast majority of text changes resulted in hamming distances less than 20, with most
less than 10. On a side note, the strong dips around 1 and 7 on the x axis most likely reflect the algorithm’s
bias to returning even hamming distances (as documented within the project) rather than any statistical
error.
4.6. Thumbnail
As with format changes, the algorithm performed strongly when responding to what really constitutes
a loss in resolution. Figure 5 displays that using the 30 hamming distance ceiling would almost guarantee
detection of all 256 pixel (long side) images as duplicates of their originals. The loss of granularity is reflected
in the results for the 128 and 64 pixel forms - both would detect most instances, but the latter definitely
wouldn’t do so for many.
The 32 pixel thumbnail plot demonstrates the limitations of perceptual hashing when dealing with low
quality imagery, with the series diving and spiking as it encounters odd numbered hamming distances. As
discussed in Section 2.1.1, quality images result in a PDQ hash containing an even number of 0 and 1 values,
leading to a far higher likelihood of even hamming distances. As the sample in Figure 2a shows, the quality
of a 32px thumbnail is quite low, legible content in such a format is extremely limited.
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Figure 2: Image treatments for test corpus. Format change not shown.
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Figure 3: Hamming distances resulting from format changes - note use of log scale
4.7. Cropping
The algorithm struggled with cropping, and itself isn’t designed to cope with such changes - instead,
additional hashes can be generated to provide what amounts to hypothetical changes, including rotation.
This option is available within the binary used, and was utilised for this test and for rotation.
Figure 6 displays that a small (<5%) removal of an image will result in hamming distances beyond our
working threshold, with results nearing random distributions by around 20% removal (i.e. a crop ratio of
80%). When the Dihedral-Transform hashes are utilised, a near average of around 57 for the closest hash is
returned across the cropping spectrum, though the use of these additional hashes would lead to (a) query
time inefficiencies and (b) a far greater change of false positives. Of course, we would also need to set a
threshold nearing 60 to utilise this approach, again increasing the likelihood of false positives.
4.8. Rotation
The algorithm’s performance largely mirrored that observed for cropping. Beyond slight (less than 5◦of
original), performance falls away sharply with only calculation of additional hashes capable of reducing
distances away from near-random distributions. As discussed, such an approach would be a good backstop
if rotated/cropped images are anticipated, but otherwise would probably lead to undesirable performance
impacts.
4.9. Speed
PDQ hash generation involved a time overhead compared to that required for MD5. Figure 8 displays
that whilst MD5 digests could be calculated for 90% of files within 0.02 seconds, PDQ was largely completed
around 0.08. This is a very reasonable amount considering PDQ is a perceptual hash (and therefore requires
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Figure 4: Hamming distances resulting text and watermark introductions
image rendering rather than simple binary reads and calculations). We did not pre-process imagery to
accelerate the process, keeping all data ’as is’ for processing. This performance can therefore be regarded
as close to worst-case for real-world use, particularly considering the use of an external binary rather than
calling integrated code.
4.10. Entropy
A fuzzy hash’s values across a sufficiently large corpus of dissimilar materials should resemble random
distribution. Such a ‘flat’ distribution of values indicates a lack of bias (intentional or otherwise) within
the algorithm, and in this instance, supports the use of a simple edit distance calculation for measuring
perceived similarities.
Figure 9 displays the mean bit values for each PDQ hash generated over each of our test corpora, plus
across all test corpora. The plot contains some peaks, indicating some biases - particularly within the
CEM corpus. A degree of bias is to be anticipated on a per corpus basis, given the propensity for certain
features (e.g. head/shoulders against a flat background for passport photos) to appear in specific genres.
This hypothesis is supported by the smoother plot for the combined corpora series.
4.11. Discussion
We found PDQ to be a robust and capable algorithm for “non-adversarially” (in the words of the project
authors) altered imagery. In particular, we found performance when dealing with resized or converted images
to be near perfect, as demonstrated by Figure 3’s sparseness - the worst result being 115 of an acceptable
match threshold away from zero.
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Figure 5: Hamming distances for generated thumbnails
As advised in project documentation, image rotation and cropping result in greatly decreased perfor-
mance, and given their impact on materials shown, should reasonably be regarded as adversarial - in other
words, being undertaken in order to defeat detection, rather than any other purpose.
The use of additional (Dihedral-Transform) hashes can help combat this, but our tests demonstrate how
their effective use would require a substantial change in match thresholds. Not discussed yet is the impact
this would have on query times, a topic we cover later in this paper.
5. Testing Video (TMK + PDQF)
As with PDQ, we utilised executables packaged with the project for our tests - in this case, tmk-hash-video
for hash generation. Unlike PDQ, given the relative complexity of calculating similarities, we used the pack-
aged binary (tmk-two-level-score) for hash comparison.
Unlike PDQ, the TMK algorithm takes a two phased approach - if the first phase passes a pre-defined
match threshold, then the second phase is attempted. If both results are higher (note contrast to PDQ)
than the threshold, then a video is regarded as a match. For our tests, we followed the recommended
threshold of 0.7 for both phases.
Note that tmk-two-level-score does not output scores if no match is detected for phase 1 - hence,
setting the threshold to -1 in effect forces full calculations.
5.1. Methodology
We undertook a series of transformations akin to those utilised in testing PDQ, but adapted for use in
video formats. The tests consisted of:
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Figure 6: Hamming distances for cropped images
1. Bitrate alteration - the visual bitrate (if applicable) or overall bitrate of the video is reduced to a
randomly selected ratio beween 0-100%, exclusive.
2. Cropping - as with still images, a randomly selected ratio in the range 0-100% (exclusive) of the original
vision is retained, centered on the existing visual centre and maintaining the existing aspect ratio.
3. Format change - the video is converted to a random selection of ’mpg’, ’mp4’, ’flv’, ’mkv’ and ’avi’
formats.
4. Half scaling - effectively the video equivalent of thumbnailing, though in this case rather than following
pre-defined sizes, the video’s existing visual dimensions are halved.
5. Text - ‘AiLECS’ (white, 40pt font) is scrolled across the screen for ten seconds, commencing one second
into the video. This is repeated every 20 seconds thereafter.
6. Title - a five second title screen (consisting of the afp logo) is added to the video’s beginning. No
content is overwritten.
7. Trimming - five seconds of content are removed from the beginning of the video.
8. Watermark - The AFP logo was added to vision, following the same placement and sizing rules detailed
within Section 4.1.
5.2. Results
Figure 10 displays the overall performance of the TMK algorithm across our tests. As with still imagery
(PDQ), the algorithm performs strongly when the perceived content changes are minimal - bitrate, scaling
and format changes are all recognised as the ‘same’ material. Watermark and cropping underperformed,
akin to that seen with still imagery. Interestingly, adding a five second title screen also saw a dramatic loss
of performance in recognising largely ‘like’ materials.
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Figure 7: Hamming distances for rotated images
5.3. Bitrate alteration
The algorithm performed extremely strongly with bitrate alterations, comfortably detecting each changed
file as a match.
5.4. Cropping
As with PDQ’s performance on still imagery, the TMK algorithm struggled with cropping. Removing
more than 20% visuals made detection improbable during both phases, but as figure 11 demonstrates, phase
1 performance drops rapidly in relation to crop ratio, until a floor of mean performance is reached around the
0.6 (i.e. removal of 40%) level. Phase 2 follows this pattern, though with a more linear drop in confidence
against cropping.
In an investigative context, we would recommend removal of more than 10% be regarded as out of scope
for reliable match detection.
5.5. Format change
Results in detecting content subjected for formatting changes closely followed those for bitrate alteration,
with all files comfortably detected as duplicate content.
5.6. Half Scaling
Results for scaling closely followed those for bitrate and format alteration, though with marginally higher
confidences within the phase 1 test. All, however, are comfortably above the match threshold of 0.7 and
would only affect cases where extremely high thresholds are undertaken.
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Figure 8: Time taken for PDQ & MD5 hash calculations
5.7. Text
Less visually intrusive than the watermark, the algorithm was largely successful in detecting duplicate
content. Whereas we assumed shorter runtimes could result in lower confidences (given the proportionately
higher level of visual change), Figure 12 shows this not to be the case.
5.8. Title
Overall, performance was disappointing in this test, with Figure 13 showing the majority of results falling
below the 0.7 threshold for both phases.
We originally hypothesised that the impact of new materials’ insertion into a single location within a
video would decrease as its relative proportion to running time decreased - in other words, the smaller the
proportion of a video being new, the lower the change. It is difficult to confirm or disprove this theory. Prima
facie, Figure 13 shows this not to be the case, as the clustering of Phase 2 scores (indicating a corresponding
pass at Phase 1) occurs around <= 1000 seconds. This, however, is in line with the underlying distribution
of runtimes within the test corpus. The absence of Phase 2 scores at longer running times could simply
reflect a seemingly random distribution of successful Phase 1 tests, given the relative scarcity of sample
data.
5.9. Trimming
The TMK algorithm’s performance in detecting ‘like’ materials after the removal of content stands in
stark contrast to addition. Figure 14 displays the results - reversing the hypothesis given in the previous
section, it would appear that performance does improve as the relative proportion of content altered (in
this case, removed) decreases. This, however, occurs at a relatively short runtimes, with results approaching
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Figure 9: Average (mean) bit values for PDQ hashes across multiple corpora (duplicate MD5 and PDQ values removed)
maximum at around 300 seconds. The only failure depicted on this plot is at an extremely short runtime,
reflecting the substantial (if not entire) removal of content from that file.
5.10. Watermark
Watermarking performance was similar for TMK as for PDQ. Figure 15 displays a mean score for videos
falling below the recommended threshold of 0.7 within phase 1. On a more positive note, phase 2 performance
was robust in cases where phase 1 was passed.
5.11. Speed
Whilst the wording is partly confusing, the project documentation lists TMK hashes as taking approxi-
mately 30x video runtime, depending on storage density. We experienced better speeds, with average hash
calculation times being approximately 140 (2.5%) of runtime - probably due to our use of local (SATA3)
based storage.
Figure 16 shows the correlation, though with variability most likely introduced by varying file sizes/compression
levels and any required conversion to supported video formats.
5.12. Entropy
The storage and comparison of PDQ hashes are relatively simple, particularly given their compact size
and simple format - 256 bit hexadecimal strings being readily transportable within a text file, or stored
as fields within databases. In comparison, the TMK algorithm (as released) stores hashes as 256 kilobyte
file - approximately 8,000 times larger. The authors make a note of the first 1 KB being sufficient for
differentiating most videos, but we are unaware of any firmer statistics regarding such performance.
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Figure 11: TMK scores vs cropping ratios. Horizontal bars indicate max, mean and minimum values for each series.
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Figure 12: Mean TMK scores for text test, taken against video running time. Note low correlation of scores to runtime,
particularly within phase 1.
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Figure 13: Mean TMK scores for title test, taken against video running time.
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Figure 14: Mean TMK scores for title test, taken against video running time.
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5.13. Discussion
We observed the TMK + PDQF algorithm to work as stated within project documentation. It is
a robust and well performing algorithm in the uses for which it was designed - format, resolution and
compression changes result in near perfect performance, closely followed by ‘light-touch’ alterations such as
text. Heavier, “adversarial” changes (as described by the project authors) such as the addition of a title
screen, watermarking and cropping beyond marginal levels result in rapid performance drops.
6. Implementation Discussion
Beyond integration and licencing concerns, arguably the greatest roadblock to the widespread law en-
forcement adoption of perceptual hashing is query time performance. Unlike cryptographic digests such as
MD5 and SHA-1 where the smallest non-zero hamming distance and maximum value are equivalent, fuzzy
hashes such as PDQ require comparison of a large proportion (if not entirety) of each value to establish
similarity. This is substantially more computationally intensive than comparing cryptographic digests - in
the case of MD5, 99.6% (1− 128 ) of digests can be disregarded after the eighth bit8. Assuming a threshold
of 30, a search for matching images using PDQ requires comparison of at least 30 bits (7.5 hex characters),
almost four times more than the overwhelming majority of MD5 digests.
The PDQ documentation includes advice and mathematical proofs on the feasibility of advice on indexing
methods such as multi-index hashing (MIH) [8] for minimising query times. We have incorporated MIH as
part of our reference implementation (refer Section 6.1), observing a drop in query times of about 33% when
compared with linear search across our test corpus, a result becoming more pronounced as the corpus size
increases.
Unlike the PDQ authors, we dropped the use of caching within the index, finding the overall speed
improvement within our tests to be marginal. This could be due to our use of python rather than a
pre-compiled executable, and in any case, cache performance is entirely dependent upon individual usage
patterns. Our implementation of MIH is available for download at https://github.com/AiLECS/pyMIH or
via pypi/pip as pyMIH.
As described earlier in this paper, TMK is also capable of accelerated performance through indexing,
with the relatively lightweight outputs of Phase 1 ample for rapidly reducing the number of candidates at
lookup. Facebook has also open-sourced faiss[9], an efficient search/indexing project with great poten-
tial for performance improvements. At time of writing, integration between TMK and faiss is faulty. A
workaround has been provided, with a fix to transparently avoid the issue reportedly in the works.
6.1. Reference Implementation
Indexing can improve performance in fuzzy hash lookups, though it will never replicate the speed of
cryptographic hashes - hence their continuing use, despite well known limitations. Computational overheads
are acceptable in smaller datasets, but grow exponentially as large-scale databases develop and grow. On-
demand (i.e. ‘cloud’) computing is one step towards overcoming delays, either by providing more resources,
or additional resources closer to the edge - i.e. where the demand is. Given existing dependencies, the PDQ
binaries are currently only deployable on *nix and MacOS systems, precluding its use on a vast majority of
corporate systems. We have packaged the PDK implementation as a Docker image9, exposing the algorithm
via a RESTful API service for accessibility. Whilst containerisation doesn’t accelerate computation, it
massively improves portability, allowing the service to spin up and down across heterogeneous host operating
systems and infrastructure. The image itself is 1.2GB, making it easily transported over standard internet
connections.
A TMK image is under construction, but due to the additional search overheads, will not be released
until a Faiss-based search back-end is completed. We anticipate release of this image by mid-late October
2019. Further development of both images will be dependent on performance and user demand.
8Second character if displayed as a hexadecimal string
9Available for download at https://github.com/JDalins/PDQContainer
21
7. Discussion
A common lament within digital forensics (and law enforcement more broadly) is the gap between R&D
and implemented, accessible tools. Microsoft’s free (in dollar terms) release of PhotoDNA was an unprece-
dented step at the time, but its ongoing status as a proprietary algorithm limits its further distribution,
evolution and application.
The release of free software, both in terms of monetary cost and restrictions on application, significantly
reduces the non-technical overheads restricting implementation of novel technologies into existing forensic
tools and workflows. In our case, a simple git clone followed by two ‘make‘ commands was sufficient for
establishing a basic tool - the entire process taking less than twenty minutes. Development of the python
script for automating testing took a further two days, making this rudimentary deployment a weekend
project.
In its current form, external dependencies limit the project’s deployment in environments other than *nix
and MacOS - the AFP (as with many other LEAs) is predominantly a Windows environment, with in-house
software development typically gravitating to .NET. The ability to call hashing algorithms directly from
existing software would represent a massive leap in the deployment potential for tools such as these. .NET
wrappers or ports 10, released and supported as part of the project, would certainly simplify deployment of
these algorithms within such environments.
Our use of the PDQ and TMK algorithms is basic, with scripts calling command line applications rather
than integrating tightly with our tools. Substantial performance increases could be achieved through tighter
coupling of libraries with host applications - the ability to directly pass image/video data in memory (rather
than via writes to file systems) alone would accelerate performance dramatically.
The AFP is moving to a loosely coupled microservices based architecture - primarily to ensure agility
in delivering the tools demanded by different crime threat domains, but also ensuring their availability
and adaptability across the organisation and beyond. The deployment of services such as image/video
similarity measurement via a container exposing a RESTful API accelerates both implementation and use:
Specialist client applications such as digital forensic tools can utilise basic HTTP libraries for the vast bulk of
integration work, whereas containers can be reliably orchestrated and rapidly deployed to areas of demand,
reducing network overheads (a critical concern given Australia’s geography). Our reference implementation
of such a service demonstrates the concept’s viability, though it must be noted that the underlying database
deployment for these microservices is going to be a matter for individual organisations.
In this review we have identified the potential value the PDQ and TMK algorithms bring to law en-
forcement, particularly in reducing repeat practitioner exposure to known (but even imperceptibly altered)
materials. The open sourcing of such algorithms presents a major (if not unprecedented) opportunity for
LEAs and their partners to not only use and share leading-edge tools, but also guide and contribute to
their development and evolution. The initiative now rests with practitioners to take the intitiative provided
by releases such as this, and where suitable, continue the development of such tools into deployable and
sustainable products.
8. The AiLECS Lab
The work depicted within this paper was undertaken as part of the Artificial Intelligence for Law Enforce-
ment & Community Safety (AiLECS) Lab, a joint Australian Federal Police/Monash University initiative
formed as part of Monash University’s ”IT for Social Good” program.
The lab’s mission is to research and develop ethical uses of machine learning within law enforcement, with
a particular focus the use of advanced data analytics in the identification and classification of psychologically
harmful materials. For more information, please refer to https://www.monash.edu/it/ailecs.
10Most likely in the form of a dll
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